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PART　ONE：
Introduction：
　　　　　It　is　extremely　interesting　to　note　that　in　encounter　and
出alogue　with　world　religions　the　possibility　of　a　new　development
of　Logos　Christology　is　in　the　process　of　being　sought　in　the
present－day　global　theological　arena．　For　this　indicates　that　the
renewal　of　apologetic　theology　or　missiology　is　only　authentically
realizable　by　the　Logos－concept　as　it　is　worked　out　in　dialogical
terms．　Theological　exclusivism　as　embodied　in　such　mission
slogans　of　genuine　evangelical　Christianity　as“Win　the　world
for　Christ”is　now　to　be　replaced　by　a　more　open　attitude
toward　other　Ways，　but　on　the　condition　that　Christians　renew
and　retain　their　conviction　about　Christianity’struthfulness　as
inclusive　of　the　uniqueness　and　universalism　of　its　own　core，
Jbsus　as　the　Christ．　In　considering　this　requirement　Robert　D．
Young　suggestively　states　in　his　book　Encount〃or〃’醜W∂714
Relig諺’α吃S：
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．．．the　only　way　to　do　justice　to　both　a　uniqueness　that
can　breed　intolerance　and　a　universalism　that　can　degenerate
into　relativism　is　by　reconsidering　some　form　of　logos
Christology．1
　　　　　We　know　that　the　past　missionary　movement　culminated
on　the　Protestant　side，　for　instance　，　in　the　First　World　Missionary
Conference　at　Edinburgh　in　1910　under　the　general　theme　of
“The　Immediate　Conquest　of　the　World，”concomitant　with　its
theological　expression　such　as　Julius　Richter’sinaugural　address
before　the　senate　of　the　theological　faculty　of　Berlin　on　his
appointment　to　the　chair　of　the　Science　of　Missions。　Richter
declared：
Mission　apologetics　is　that　branch　of　theology　which　in
opposition　to　the　non－Christian　religions，　shows　the
Christian　religion　to　be　the　Way，　the　Truth　and　the　Life；
which　seeks　to　dispossess　the　non－Christian　religions　and
to　plant　in　their　stead　in　the　soil　of　heathen　national　life
the　evangelic　faith　and　Christian　life．2
　　　　　This　famous　passage　has　led　Young　to　notice　attentively
that“．．．what　we　are　dealing　with　in　the　Christian　faith　is　not
an　exclusivism　that　remains　provincial　and　quiet，　but　one　that
is　a　hard－driving　force．”3　This　is　particularly　true　of　the　global
situation　in　which　we　find　ourselves　today　after　the　Soviet
Russia　as　a（）ommunist　super　power　establishing　itself　in　opposition
to　the　United　States　and　its　Westem　allies　has　suddenly　collapsed
and　disappeared　in　1991．　For　the　demise　of　the　Soviet　Russia
has　left　the　world－wide　political　vacuum　in　which　we　now　are
beginning　to　observe　the　strong　resurgence　of　Christendom　in
the　name　of“global　governance”as　a　religio－political　power　on
aglobal　scale　while　some　people，　including　Samuel　Huntington，
speaking　of“The　Clash　of　Civilizations？”with　Christendom　at
its　center．
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　　　　　It　is　exactly　in　this　connection　that　we　need　to　acknowledge
that　a　group　of　intuitive　theologians－such　as　Paul　Tillich　in
the　final　stage　of　his　career（whom　I　might　designate　as“Tillich
II”in　distinction　from　the　Tillich　of　Systematic　Theology　who　is
to　be　called“Tillich　I”），Katsumi　Takizawa，　and　John　B．　Cobb，
Jr．－began　their　original　thinkings　in　order　to　eliminate，　or
more　correctly，　to　transform，　the　total　framework　of　the　conventiona1
“arrogant”Christianity．　They　have　unanimously　found　the
Logos－concept　anew　from　the　biblical　tradition　as　that　which　is
at　once　universal　and　concrete．
　　　　　Their　contributions，　on　the　one　hand，　are　not　restricted
within　the　boundary　of“theology”in　the　tranditional　sense，
inasmuch　as　the　Logos，　as　it　has　been　re－discovered　by　them，
is　universal，　extending　even　beyond　the　walls　of　the　Christian
Church．　Yet，　on　the　other，　they　are　not　merely　dispassionate，
objectivistic　observers　of　world－events　including　history　of
religions．　By　contrast，　the　1惚〃g諺’o㎜’ssenschaノ渉scholars　belonging
to　the　prededing　generations，　such　as　Nicolai　Hartmann，　Rudolf
Eucken，　and　Ernst　Troeltsch，　although　they　were　committed
Christians　in　their　personal　lives　and　belie卜systems，　strove　to
show　the　superiority　of　Christianity　against　the　background　of
止eir　common　desire　to　find　the　naturalistic，　objectively　observable，
origin　of　religious　ideas．　Such　is　not　the　case，　however，　with
the　above－mentioned　theologians．　Their　common　concem　is　for
anormative　understanding　of　world－events，　espetially　of　world
religions．　Thus，“theology　of　religions，”to　borrow　a　suggestive
term　proposed　by　another　prominent　original　theological　thinker，
Wolfhart　Pannenberg，　is　their　common　interest，　and　it　is　the
name　of　a　newly　emergent　discipline　of　theology．
　　　　　　Since　the　publication　of　Paul　F．　Knitter’s／Vo　Other
1＞ヒa〃ze～’　ノ1　Critical　Survey　o∫Chri’stian　／lttitndes　Toward　the　ワレ’orld
飽1ゴg諺’ons　in　1985，however，　the　discipline　of　theology　of　religions
has　entered　a　new　era；he　has　sub－divided　the　category　of
inter－religiOUS　tOleranCe　intO　tWO　CIaSSeS：InCIUSiViSm（Or
Christo－centrism）and　Pluralism（or　Theo－centrism）．　Now　the
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above－mentioned　intuitive　theologians　are　considered（and，　I
think，　to　a　certain　extent　mistakenly）under　the　general　heading
of　Christo－centric　Inclusivism　as　opposed　to　Theo－centric　Pluralism，
which　is　Knitter’sown　position．　Knitter’smajor　idea　is　that，
while　Christo－centric　inclusivists，　as　is　typically　characteristic　of
Karl　Rahner’stheory　of“anonymous　Christians”in　reference　to
other　religionists，　tend　to　think　of　including　other　world　religions
within　their　own　realm　of　Christ，　The（rcentric　pluralists（including
John　Hich　and　Knitter　himself）can　account　for　the　existence　of
other　religions　as　manifesting　equally　authentically　the　noumenal
Deity　as　such　who　is　beyond　and　above　the　realm　of　manifestation
or　aPPearance　or　incarnation．
　　　　　As　a　result，　it　appears　that　Christo－centric　inclusivists　are
presumptuous　to　think　of　other　religionists　as　included　within
the　Christ－figure　at　no　request　of　their　own，　whereas　Theo－centric
pluralists　are　truly　open－minded　due　to　their　supra－religious
notion　of“Theos”．　Is　this　really　an　ideal　situation　for　authentic
inter－religious　dialogue？Ithink　not．　Why　not？Because　it
seems　to　me　that（1）the　notion　of　Christ　Christo－centric
inclusivists　of　the　Rahnerian　type　espouse　is　not　really　deep
enough　to　be　incarnate　and　alive　in　every　one　of　us　even　apart
from　the　Christ－figure　in　Jesus　of　Nazareth　and　that（2）there
is，　in　the　vision　of　God　Theo－centric　pluralists　present，　no
reference　to　their　crucial　capability　of　clarifying　God’sown
ontological”（an　sz’ch）relatedness　to　us　humans－even　prior　to
the　appearance　of　God“for　us”（fi’r　uns），for　instance，　in　the
Incarnation　of　the　Word　of　God　in　the　life　and　history　of　Jesus
of　Nazareth．
　　　　　This　double　issue，　however，　is　inherent　in　the　Logosrconcept
as　it　is　elucidated　and　articulated　by　our　two　authors，　Paul
Tillich　and　Katsumi　Takizawa，　if　I　am　correct．　What　we　need
in　our　contemporary　attempt　at　constructing　Logos　Christology
anew　are，　accordingly，　a　deeper　knowledge　of　Christ　and　a
closer　vision　of　God．　But　how　can　this　double　requiremnet　be
satisfied　in　du．e　measure？
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　　　　　In　what　follows　let　me　study　comparatively　the　ways　in
which　Paul　Tillich　and　Katsumi　Takizawa　try　to　answer　the
above　question　in　search　of　a　new　possibility　of　Logos　Christology
for　today，　especially　in　encounter　and　dialogue　with　Buddhism．
Ipropose　to　critically　survey　the　characteristics　of　their　respective
Logos　Christologies：（1）in　their　confrontations　with　the　present－day
religious　situation；（2）in　their　struggles　to　find　a　normative
basis　for　the　theological　understanding　of　religions；　（3）　in　their
encounters　and　dialogues　with　Buddhism；and（4）in　their
theological　definitions　of　the　Logos．　Other　examples　of　Logos
Christology　will　also　be　referred　to　in　terms　of　the　Christian
interpretation　of　Buddhism．
　　　　　　　り1．Tillich　s　l－ogos　Christology　and　Buddhism
　　　　　Tillich’　s　Logos　Christology　appears　quite　distictive　in　his
significant　attempt　at　interpreting　Buddhism　，　Chrt’stiani°ty　and　the
Encozenter　oアthe　Wcrld　Reli8t’ons（first　given　as　the　four　Bampton
Lectures　for　1962　in　the　fall　of　1961　in　the　Law　Memorial
Library　of　Columbia　University，　and　published　in　1963）．　He
holds　that　in　early　Christianity　the　judgment　of　other　religions
was　determined　by　the　idea　of　the　Logos．　Moreover，　it　is
important　for　him　to　observe　that　the　Church　Fathers　emphasized
the　universal　presence　of　the　Logos，　the　Word，　the　principle　of
divine　self－manifestation，　in　all　religions　and　cultures．　For　if　we
see　this　fact　in　the　new　light　of　the　present　encounter　with　the
world　religions，　it　shows　that“early　Christianity　did　not　consider
itself　as　a　radical－exclusive，　but　as　the　all－inclusive　religion　in
the　sense　of　the　saying：‘All　that　is　true　anywhere　in　the
world　belongs　to　us　the　Christians’．”4
　　　　　Here　Tillich　presents　himself　as　a　Logos－centric　inclusivist．
But　the　crucial　question　is，　Of　what　kind？For　it　seems　to　me
that　what　he　thinks　by　the　Logos　is　not　really　identical　with
what　Rahnerian　inclusivists　mean　to　say　by　their　Christo－centric
inclusivism　as　it　expresses　itself　in　the　idea　of“anonymous
Christians．”Tillich’sreference　to　the　Logos　as“the　principle　of
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divine　sel卜manifestation，　in　all　religions　and　cultures”rather
sounds，　at　least　to　me，1ike　Theo－centric　pluralism　of　the
Hickian　type　except　for　the　fact　that　what　lies　at　the　center　of
his　theological　thinking　in　this　context　is　the　Logos，　but　not
the　noumenal　God　as　in　the　case　of　Hick　and　Knitter．
　　　　　The　kind　of　a　Logos－centric　inclusivist　that　Tillich　is，　is
characterized　by　himself　by　reference　to　his　theological　posture
as“≠氏@observing　participant”in　the　history　of　religions．　As
such，　he　was　quite　aware　of　the　theological　situation　of　the
early　1960’s．　Tillich　characterized　it　by　way　of　negation　when
he　referred　to　his　two　basic　decisions　in　his　last　public　lecture
（“The　Significance　of　the　History　of　Religions　for　the　Systematic
Theologian，”delivered　on　October　12，1965）as　follows：
Atheologian　who　accepts　the　subject，“The　Significance
of　the　History　of　Religions　for　the　Systematic　Theologian，”
and　takes　this　subject　seriously，　has　already　made，　explicitly
or　implicitly，　two　basic　decisions．　On　the　one　hand　he
has　separated　himself　from　a　theology　which　rejects　all
religions　other　than　that　of　which　he　is　a　theologian．　On
the　other　hand　if　one　acccepts　the　subject　affirmatively
and　seriously，　he　has　rejected　the　paradox　of　a　religion　of
non－religion，　or　a　theology　without　theos，　also　called　a
theology　of　the　secular．5
　　　　　For　Tillich，　the　theological　task　during　his　final　years　in
the　1960’slay　between　two　exreme　attitudes　toward　religions：
exclusivism　as　manifested　in　the　theology　of　Karl　Barth　and
relativism　as　most　sharply　expressed　in　the　so－called　theology－
without－God　language　or　death－ofLGod　theology．　In　a　word，　he
dealt　with　a　religious　Way　other　than　Christianity　as“another
or　different　fragmentary　manifestation　of　theonomy　or　of　the
Religion　of　the　Concrete　Spirit”（FR，80）．
　　　　　This　understanding　of　other　religious　Way（s）in　Tillich’s
Logos　Christology　reminds　me　of　the　Far　Eastem　Buddhist－Barthian
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thinker　Katsumi　Takizawa’sview　of　religions　as“various，
particular　reflections　or　echoes　within　the　setting　of　this　world
of　the　absolute　source　of　actual　human　life，　of　the　common
basis　of　all　humankind，　or　of　the　True‘Dharma，’　namely　，　the
one　Logos　inherent　in　this　source．”6　However，　there　is　one
important　difference　between　their　thoughts：what　Takizawa
calls　“the　absolute　source”is　not“religion”　at　all　insofar　as　it　is
the　real　ground　of　the　whole　life　and　history　of　humankind，
including　a　true　religion，　whereas　Tillich’sidea　of“theonomy”
can　be　equated，　as　is　shown　above，　with“The　Religion　of　the
Concrete　Spirit．”
　　　　　This　difference　might　have　resulted　from　their　respectively
different　understandings　of　what　the　Logos　truly　is　like．　I　wilI
consider　this　issue　in　detail　later．　At　the　present　stage　of　my
presentation，　though，　let　me　confirm　and　stress　one　important
common　feature　observable　in　their　thoughts：they　both　regard
religions　as“manifestations”or“reflections”of　the　Logos．
A．Quasi－Religions　and　the　Re髄gious　Situation　of　Today
　　　　　　One　of　the　prominent　Buddhist　dialogue－partners　of
Tillich，　Masao　Abe　has　written　a　critical　review　article　on
Tillich’C伽∫吻π吻and　the　Encounter　oア’舵VVorld　Religions．　Abe
agrees　with　Tillich　that　the　main　characteristic　of　the　present
encounter　of　the　world　religions　lies　not　so　much　in　their
mutual　encounter　as　in　their　encounter　with　the　quasi－religions
of　today．7　Noticeably　enough，　however，　Abe　prefers　the　terms
“irreligion”or“anti－religion”to“quasi－religion．”
　　　　　By　quasi－religions　Tillich　means　Fascism，　Communism，
and　Liberal　Humanism．｝艶does　not㎜止e　tenn“pseudOfreligions”
because　this　is　for　him　as　imprecise　as　it　is　unfair．“Pseudo，”
in　his　view，　indicates　an　intended　but　deceptive　similarity；by
contrast，“曹浮≠唐堰gindicates　a　genuine　similarity，　not　intended，
but　based　on　points　of　identity．　And　he　holds　that　this　latter
mode，　certainly，　is“the　situation　in　cases　like　Fascism　and
Communism，　the　most　extreme　examples　of　quasi－religions
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today”（CEWR，5）．　At　any　rate，　it　seems　to　me　that　by　using
the　concept　of“quasi－religion（s）”Tillich　was　able　to　probe
theologically　into　the　religious　semantics　of　modern　secular
society．　This　concept，　in　other　words，　has　turned　out　to　be　a
useful　weapon　for　his　theology　of　culture　as　this　becomes　aware
of　itself　in　confrontation　with　the　religious　situation　of　today．
In　my　own　opinion，　Tillich　has　thus　cultivated　a　new　avenue
to　envisioning　the　political　realm　of　apologetic　theology　or
missiology　by　way　of　Logos　Christology－the　realm　which　Paul
F．Knitter　nowadays　wants　to　articulate　by　his　idea　of
“Kingdom－centered　mission．”8　Let　me　scrutinize　Tillich’sattempt
in　comparison　with　Takizawa’sLogos　Christology　of　politics　as
follows：
　　　　　1．Tillich’ssuccess　in　this　regard，　in　my　view，　would　be
achievable　only　as　far　as　his　definition　of“religion”underlying
the　concept　of“quasi－religion”was　sufficiently　workable．　His
definition　of　religion　is　famous：“Religion　is　the　state　of　being
grasped　by　an　ultimate　concern，　a　concern　which　qualifies　all
other　concerns　as　preliminary　and　which　itself　contains　the
answer　to　the　question　of　the　meaning　of　our　life”（CEWR，5）．
One　can　discern　in　this　definition　of　religion　some　affinities　to
Schleiermacher’sidea　of“5c肋c1泌痂㎜幽№?刀@Abhaengt°gkeitsgefuel”and
to　Rudolf　Otto’ssense　of“4αs　Hei〃ge．”In　comparison　with
religion　as　thus　defined，　Tillich　rightly　observes　in　secular
quasi－religions　that　the　ultimate　concern　is　directed　towards
objects　like　nation，　science，　a　particular　form　or　stage　of
society，　or　a　highest　ideal　of　humanity，　which　are　then　considered
diVine”（CEWR，5）．That　is，　at　the　core　of　Tillich’sunderstanding
of　quasi－religions　is　the　notion　of　the　misplaced　directivity　of
the　ultimate　concern　that　takes　various　modes　according　to　the
objects　with　which　people　are　ultimately　concerned．
　　　　　　2．Tillich’srightness　in　dealing　with伽quasi－religions
appear　does　not　necesarily　mean，　however，　that　he　has　correctly
solved　the　question　of　why　quasi－religions　appear　in　the　world
at　all　as　distingishable　from　religions，　whether　theistic　or
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non－theistic．　Unlike　Tillich，　Takizawa　does　not　deal　with　the
alienated　structures　of　human　mentality　as　revealed　in　the　midst
of　modern　society　in　terms　of　a　general　idea（such　as　the
notion　of　misplaced　directivity　of　the　ultimate　concem）．　Rather，
he　considers　such　alienated　structures　as　Fascism，　Communism，
and　Liberal　Humanism　as　resulting　from　humans’search　for
“free　subjectivity”apart　from　the　source　of　human　life　or　the
divine－human　unity　qua　the　Logos　that　exists　at　the　base　of
every　human　being　where　each　and　every　person’fundamental－
universal　solidadty　with　the　entire　nature　and　all　humanity　does
prevail．9　Takizawa　sometimes　depicts　this　state　of　affairs　by
reference　to　Pascal’sidea　of“dive7ti∬e〃len〆or　self－forgetful
amusement　to　which　one　is　tempted　to　abandon　oneself　by　what
Karl　Barth　designates　as“吻s　N肋漉8〆or　mere　nothingness
（meaning　the　Satan）（RAMT，154－5）．
　　　　　　3．Yet，　in　accounting　for　the　quasi－religious　situation　of
today　Tillich　is　keen　enough　to　point　out　that　the　technological
invasion　of　the　traditional　cultures　and　religions　all　over　the
world　has　resulted　in“secularism　and　religious　indifference”
（CEWR，13）．He　even　refers　to　Japan’speculiar　situation，
saying：“The　Christian　missionaries　there　told　me　that　they　are
much　less　worried　about　Buddhism　and　Shintoism　than　about
the　enormous　amount　of　indifference　towards　all　religions”
（CEWR，12）．What　he　observes，　then，　as　lacking　in　present－day
Japan　are　two　things：“the　vocational　elements　in　national　life”
（CEWR，16）and“the　spiritual　roots　of　democracy”（CEWR，
25）．Let　me　speak　of　them　one　after　another．
　　　　　First，　within　the　purview　of　Tillich’spolitical　missiology
it　appears　that　a　nation　is　determined　by　two　elements：its
natural　sel卜誼imation　as　a　living　and　growing　Power－structure；
and，　at　the　same　time，　the　consciousness　of　having　a　vocation，
namely，　to　represent　and　defend　a　principle　of　ultimate　significance．
And　he　thinks　of　the　unity　of　these　two　elements　as　that　which
makes　the　quasi－religious　character　of　nationalism　possible．　He
takes　up　these　examples：
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［A］．．．the　Hellenistic　people　were　conscious　of　representing
culture　as　against　the　barbarians；Rome　represented　the
law；the　Jew　the　divine　covenant　with　man；and　medieval
Germany　the　ccrpzts　Cんη’Stianum，　religiously　and　politically．
The　Italians　were　the　nation　of　the　rebirth（RinasCimento）；
the　British　represented　a　Christian　humanism　for　all
nations，　especially　the　primitive　ones；France　represented
the　hightest　contemporary　culture；and　Russia　the　saving
power　of　the　East　against　the　West；China　was　the　land
of　the“center，”which　all　lesser　nations　encircled．　And
America　is　the　land　of　the　new　beginning　and　the　defender
of　freedom．　And　now　this　national　idea　has　reached
almost　all　parts　of　the　world　and　has　shown　both　its
creative　and　its　destructive　possibilities．（CEWR，16）
　　　　　In　Tillich’sopinion，　although　there　is　no　nation　in　which
the　power　element　is　lacking，　in　the　sense　of　power　to　exist　as
an　organized　group　at　a　definite　place　at　a　definite　time，　yet
there　are　cases，　though　not　very　frequent，　in　which　the　vocational
element　is　minimized　by　the　power　element．　Examples　to　be
noted　are　Bismarck’sGermany　and　Tojo’sJapan（CEWR，17）．
And　he　holds　that　present－day　Japan　is　still　looking　for　a
vocational　symbo1（CEWR，17）．
　　　　　Second，　despite　the　invasion　into　na廿onal　life　of　a　t㏄hnological
civilization　and　of　a　religiously　indifferent　secularism，　Tillich
notices　attentively　that　the　liberal－humanist　and　the　Christian－
Protestant　ideas　are　an　important　reality　in　Japan，　not　measurable
by　statistics．　And　he　even　writes：
［B］Japan　has　gratefully　received　democracy　from　the
hands　of　its　conqueror，　but　democracy　needs　spiritual
roots　as　well　as　sociologically　favorable　conditions．　And
they　are　lacking．　Neither　Shintoism　nor　Buddhism－and
most　Japanese　are　adherents　of　both　religions　at　the　same
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time－has　symbols　or　ideas　which　can　become　productive
and　protective　for　democracy．　Thus　it　was　possible　for　a
demonically　redicalized　militaristic　Fascism　to　come　into
power．　It　is　now　as　hated　in　Japaii　as　Nazism　is　in（lermany，
and　the　thinking　people　have　asked　themselves　about　the
spiritual　roots　of　democracy，　and　asked　me　to　lecture　on
the　subject．（CEWR，25）
　　　　　Then，　here　arises　a　question　in　my　mind：How　are“the
vocational　elements　in　national　life”related　to“the　spiritual
roots　of　democracy”in　Tillich’sLogos　Christological　thinking
about　quasi－religion（s）？Does　he　have　anything　to　say　in　answer
to　this　question？Yes，　of　course．　Let　me　quote　the　following
passage・
［C］The　future　of　all　Asiatic　and　African　nationalisms　is
dependent　upon　the　character　of　their　v㏄ational　consciousness
and　its　relation　to　their　will　to　power．　If　their　quasi－religious
claim　is　only　a　claim　to　national　power，　it　is　demonic　and
self－destructive；if　it　is　united　with　a　powerful　vocational
consciousness，　imperialism　can　develop　with　a　good　conscience
and　produce　empires　in　which　creative　and　destructive
elements　are　mixed．　If　the　national　consciousness　is
humanized　and　becomes　aware　both　of　its　own　finite
validity　and　the　infinite　significance　of　that　which　it
represents（though　ambiguously），anation　can　become　a
representative　of　the　supranational　unity　of　mankind－in
religious　language，　of　the　Kingdom　of　God．（CEWR，17）
　　　　　It　is　clear　above　that　Tillich　is　mindful　enough　to　the
relation　between［A］“the　vocational　elements　in　national　life”
and［B］“the　spiritual　roots　of　democracy”in　terms　of［C］the
notion　of“representation．”The　former　represents　the　latter
simply　because，　as　I　want　to　emphasize　here，　the　former　is
truly　loyal　to　the　latter．　It　is　crucial　to　note，　with　Takizawa，that，
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all　that　Westerners（including　Tillich）and　most　post－war
Japanese　intellectuals　knew　about　Japan　to　the　contrary，　this
state　of　affairs　has　been　known　to　the　Japanese　people　through
the　notion　of　the　emperor’sseat（JPn．，za）or　existence　from
ancient　times．　For　him，　the　error　of　Japanese　militarism　during
World　War　II　is　not　attributable　to　this　ancient　Japanese　tradition
as　such，　but　rather　to　its　modernistic　misunderstanding　by　the
Japanese　leaders　and　intellectuals　themselves．
　　　　　　According　to　Takizawa，　the　emperor’sseat　or　existence
signifies　at　least　two　to　three　dimensions　as　follows：
（1）The　divine－human　proto－relation　as　such　as　this
inheres　in　the　depths　of　the　emperor’sexistence　insofar
as　he　is　also　an　individual　person　like　other　human　beings．
（2）The　emperor　as　he　takes　an　actual　form　as　a　human
subject　while　he　sits　at　the　central　seat　of　Japan，　as　one
of　many　nation　states　on　earth　representing　the　Logos，
the　universal　ground　of　all　humankind，　in　the　world．
（2－a）The　actual　existence　of　the　emperor　as　he　represents
in　and　through　his　seat　the　impeccability　of　the　central
seat　of　the　state－－the　impeccability　of　the　seat　as　such
that　cannot　be　lost　irrespective　of　whether　its　actual
forms　are　right　or　wrong，　good　or　evil－that　cannot　but
be　known　consciously　as　finally　indispensable　to　the
collective　life　of　humanity．
（2－b）The　emperor　as　he　actually　speaks　and　behaves　as　a
heavily　responsible　person　for　the　said　central　seat，　while
at　the　same　time　being　an　individual　person　like　all　other
persons．（SFI，348）
　　　　　　Takizawa　thinks　of　dimention（2－b）as　susceptible　of
moral　and　political　critiques，　but　he　perceives　that　dimention
（2－a）cannot　be　the　object　of　critiques　in’勿s　same　sense　although
it　is　not　free　from　the　critical　scrutiny　and　understanding　of
every　intelligent　mind　insofar　as　it　is　but　a　form　of　the　human
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subject　who　has　come　to　be　within　history．（There　is　no　actual
form　of　one’shuman　existence，　in　Takizawa’sview，　that　can
stand　outside　the　pre－reflective　and　reflective　or　conscious
critical　scrutiny　of　it　by　oneself　or　others．）　（SFI，348）Further－
more，　Takizawa　adds　another　very　crucial　comment　to　the
above－cited　passage：“The　only　thing　I　want　to　say　here　is　that
it　can　be　questioned　to　what　degree　the　emperor’sseat　or
existence　is　apPropriate　and　adequate，　especially　in　our　global
age，　as　a　visible　and　tangible　mode　of　expressing　and　representing
the　impeccability　peculiar　to　the　central　status　of　the　state　that
is　necessarily　urged　to　be　from　the　bottom　of　the　coming－to－be
of　the　human　subject”（SFI，348）．
　　　　　Thus，　it　now　tums　out　that　the　political　realm　of　apologetic
theology　or　missiology，　as　this　has　been　considered　by　Tillich
in　terms　of“the　vocational　element　in　politics”and　by　Takizawa
in　terms　of“expressing　and　representing　the　impeccability
peculiar　to　the　central　status　of　the　state，”　are　predicated　upon
its　religious　or　ontological　basis，　namely　what　Tillich　calls“the
spiritual　roots　of　democracy”which　is　comparable　to　what
Takizawa　refers　to　as“the　bottom　of　the　coming－to　be　of　the
human　subject，野And　it　is　precisely　here　that　we　should　ascertain
“the　importance　of　Buddhist－Christian　dialogue”（see　I，　C，
below）in　conjunction　with“the　task　of　judging　religions　by　the
principle　of　Jesus　as　the　Christ，　as　far　as　the　Christian　perspective
of　the　dialogue　is　conceme♂（see　I，　B，　below）．
　　　　　That　is　to　say，　the　tasks　of　constructing　Logos　Christology
anew　and　promoting　Buddhist－Christian　dialogue　are　now　to　be
constituting　the　basic　sciences　for　scrutining　and　establishing
political　missiology　in　search　of　a“New　World　Order”in　our
global　age　after　the　demise　of　the　Soviet　Union．　In　my　opinion，
Tillich’ssmall　masterpiece　he　has　produced　and　bequeathed　to
us　from　out　of　his　final　theological　struggle，　is　significant　in　its
articulation　of　this　threefold　format　and　in　its　potential　dialogical
relationship　with　Takizawa’sworks　on　Christology，　Buddhism
and　Christianity，　and　the　Japanese　mind．
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B．The　Normative　Basis　for　the　Theological　Understanding　of
　　　Religions：Jesus　the　Christ
　　　　　In　the　second　chapter　of　the　afore－mentioned　book　Tillich
deals　with℃hristian　Principles　of　Judging　NonrChdstian　Religions．”
First，　he　begins　with　introducing　a　rather　general　consideration
concerning　all　religions　and，　even　more　generally，　all　social
groups，　and　says：“If　a　group－like　an　individual－is　convinced
that　it　possesses　a　truth，　it　implicitly　denies　those　claims　to
truth　which　conflict　with　that　truth．　I　would　call　this　the
natural　self－affirmation　in　the　realm　of　knowledge；it　is　only
another　word　for　personal　certainty”（CEWR，28）。At　this　level
Christianity　in　encounter　with　other　religions，　as　well　as　with
quasi－religions，　rejects　their　claims　insofar　as　they　contradict
the　Christian　principle，　implicitly　or　explicitly．
　　　　　But　it　then　turns　out，　secondarily，　that　the　problem，　as
Tillich　considers　it　consciously　and　seriouly，　is　not　the　right　of
rejecting　that　which　reject　us；rather　it　is　the　nature　of　this
rejection．　He　differentiates　three　cases：（1）the　rejection　of
everything　for　which　the　opposite　group　stands；（2）apartial
rejection　together　with　a　partial　acceptance　of　assertions　of　the
oPPosite　group；　and　（3）　a　dialectical　union　of　rejection　and
acceptance　in　the　relation　of　the　two　groups（CEWR，29）．
Tillich　himself　wants　to　take　the　third　attitude　toward　other
groups，　religious　and　quasi－religious，　while　Karl　Barth　opts　for
the　first　position　with　regard　to　his　attitudes　toward　other
religions　and　quasi－religions，　especially　toward　Nazism（in　this
case，　with　enough　justice）；Troeltsch’sidea　of“cross－fertilization”
might　be　put　in　the　second　box－although　only　within　the
purview　of　cultural　exchange　to　the　exclusion　of　in－depth
inter－religious　dialogue（see　CEWR，44－45，43，46）．
　　　　　　Third，　referring　to“the　exclusive　monotheism　of　the
prophetic　religion”in　the　same　chapter，　Tillich　sharpens　his
own　position　and　stresses　the　universal　validity　of　justice，　in
the　sense　that“justice　is　a　principle　which　transcends　every
particular　religion　and　makes　the　exclusiveness　of　any　particular
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religion　conditional”（CEWR，32）．　This　principle　of“conditional
exclusiveness”@is　crucial　in　his　inquiry　into　the　attitudes　of
Christianity　toward　the　world　religions．　Tillich　refers　to　Jesus’
words，　for　instance，　in　the　grand　scene　of　the　ultimate　judgment
（Matt．25：31ff．）and　in　the　story　of　the　Good　Samaritans　as
those　which　basically　confirm　this　principle．
　　　　　Fourth，　more　important，　for　Tillich，　is　the　fact　that　Jesus
as　the　Christ　stands　behind　this　principle　manifested　in　Jesus’
words．　The　following　quotations　will　clarify　his　point：10
［1］　It　is　necessary［for　the　Christian　theologian］to　accept
the　vision　of　early　Christianity　that　if　Jesus　is　called　the
Christ　he　must　represent　everything　particular　and　must
be　the　point　of　identity　between　the　absolutely　concrete
and　the　absolutely　universal．11
［2］The　first　and　basic　answer　theology　must　give　to　the
question　of　the　finality　of　the　revelation　in　Jesus　as　the
Christ　is　the　following：arevelation　is　final　if　it　has　the
power　of　negating　itself　without　losing　itself．．．．Jesus　of
Nazareth　is　the　medium　of　final　revelation　because　he
sacrefices　himself　completely　to　Jesus　as　the　Christ。（ST，
1，　133，　136）
［3］Jesus　is　the　religious　and　theological　object　as　the
Christ　and　only　as　the　Christ．　And　he　is　the　Christ　as
the　one　who　sacrifices　what　is　merely“Jesus”in　him．
The　decisive　trait　in　his　picture　is　the　continuous　selftsurrender
of　Jesus　who　is　Jesus　to　Jesus　who　is　the　Christ．（ST，1，
134）
　　　　　It　is　precisely　in　accordance　with　these　passages　in　Systematic
71beology，　Vol．　I　that　Tillich　has　finally　come　to　say　in　reference
to“Christianity　Judging　Itself　in　the　Light　of　Its　Encounter
with　the　World　Religions”（Ch．　Four）as　follows：
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It［the　Christ　event，　which　is　the　appearance　and　reception
of　Jesus　of　Nazareth　as　the　Christ，　a　symbol　which　stands
for　the　decisive　self－manifestation　in　human　history　of　the
source　and　aim　of　all　being］is　a　personal　life，　the　image
of　which，　as　it　impressed　itself　on　his　followers，　shows
no　break　in　his　relation　to　God　and　no　claim　for　himself
in　his　particularity．　What　is　particular　in　him　is　that　he
crucified　the　particular　in　himself　for　the　sake　of　the
universa1．　This　liberates　his　image　from　bondage　both　to
aparticular　religion－the　religion　to　which　he　belonged
has　thrown　him　out－and　to　the　religious　sphere　as　such；
the　principle　of　love　in　him　embraces　the　cosmos，　including
both　the　religious　and　the　secular　spheres．　With　this
image，　particular　yet　free　from　particularity，　religious　yet
free　from　religion，　the　criteria　are　given　under　which
Christianity　must　judge　itself　and，　by　judging　itself，　judge
also　the　other　religions　and　the　quasi－religions．（CEWR，
81－82）
　　　　　At　this　stage　of　my　presentation　a　word　may　be　in　order
with　regard　to　our　other　dialqgue－partner　Takizawa’sparallel
grasp　of　Christology　which　provides　for　him　a　basis　for　dialogue
with　Buddhism．　Actually，　I　am　surprised　to　find　that　Tillich’s
peculiar　ideas－such　as“the　point　of　identity，”“the　medium　of
final　revelation，”　and　“the　continuous　self－surrender，”　all
refening　to　how　J6sus　of　Nazareth　related　to　the　Christrcorrespond
point　by　point　respectively　to　Takizawa’sconcepts　of“inseparable”
（Jl）n．，fukabUn），　“irreversible”　（プ’ukagツaha），　and　“non－identical”
（fukadb）which　he　uses　in　order　to　understand　and　express　the
internal　relation　of　Jesus　to　the　Christ　as　this　is　re－enacted　in
the　lives　of　his　followers．　Let　me　explain　as　follows：
（1）According　to　Takizawa，　when　the　disciples　experienced
Jesus’death　on　the　cross　and　their　inability　to　follow　him
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to　the　last　as　a　grave　tragedy　and　had　falled　into　despair
and　then　when　they　came　to　truly　realize　the　hidden
“core”盾?@Jesus’personality　as　the　power　of　salvation　and
creation　which　was　here　and　now　inseparable　from　their
own　existence，　the　Christian　confession“Jesus　is　the
Christ”first　came　into　being．
（2）Takizawa，　then，　proceeds　to　state　that　the　disciples，
therefore，understood　the　true　meaning　of　Jbsus’life　up
until　his　death　on　the　cross，　as　follows：the　Logos－the
power　of　salvation　and　creation－took　the　irrezAerSi°ble，　i．e．，
gracious，　free，　and　decisive　initiative　to　become　flesh　and
dwell　among　them　so　as　to　make　them　awaken　to　salvation．
（3）Third，　Takizawa　contends　that　the　disciples　for　the
first　time　grasped　the　meaning　of　their　lives　on　earth．
They　realized　that　they　could　fulfill　the　divine　purpose
inherent　in　their　lives　insofar　as　they　ref【ected　in　themselves
the　supreme　light　of　the　Lord　Christ，　or　of　the　Logos，　by
following　Jesus．　This　divine　purpose　is　inherent　in　every
life　and　yet　is　mot　itselアidentical　with　life．12
　　　　　Takizawa’sview　of　Jesus　the　Christ－or　his　understanding
of　how　the　Christian　confession“Jesus　is　the　Christ，　the　Son　of
God”came　to　be－－when　carefully　examined，　however，　can　be
fbund　slightly　but　crucially　different　from　Tillich’saforermentioned
thesis．　Tillich　presents　the　afore－mentioned　threefold　distinction
／relation　between　Jesus　of　Nazareth　and　the　Christ，　the　incarnate
Logos．　By　contrast　，　Takizawa　perceives　this　threefold　distinction
／relation　as　resulting　from　the　deeper　dimension　of　Christology，
the　Logos　as　such．　From　this　perspective　Takizawa　differentiates
three　dimensions　in　Jesus　the　Christ　as　follows：
（1）The　substantial　and　necessary　unity　，　along　with
irreversible　distinction，　between　God　and　the　human
being．
（2－a）The　functional　and　necessary　unity，　along　with
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irreversible　distinction　，　between　God　and　the　human
being．
（2－b）The　contingent　unity　between　God　and　a　perfectly
responsive　man　Jesus　of　Nazareth（inasmuch　as　it　hapPened
only　at　a　particular　time　and　in　a　particular　place）．
（SBC，76）
　　　　　In　my　own　view，　Takizawa’sthesis　l　refers　to　the　Logos，
while　thesis　2－a　speaking　of　the　Christ　as　the　incarnate　Logos
and　thesis　2－b　of　what　Tillich　calls“Jesus　who　is　Jesus．”By
the　term“unity”Takizawa　shows　that　the　Logos　is　not　a　third
possibility　besides　God　the　Creator　and　humanity，　but　rather
“is”at　once　God　and　humanity－that　is，　at　once　necessary　and
contingent．　As　such，　the　Logos　is，　for　Takizawa，　the　fUndamental
mode　of　interrelatedness　of　God　and　humanity，　which　he　refers
to　as　the　Prota－factum　Immanuel（God　with　us）．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　り　　　　　　In　order　to　ascertain　the　locus　theologi’cus　of　Takizawa　s
idea　of　the　Proto－faCtum　Immanuel　at　this　juncture，　it　would　be
fitting　for　me　to　quote　Tillich’swords　as　follows：“The　logos
has　been　called　the　mirror　of　the　divine　depth，　the　principle　of
God’sself－objectification．　In　the　logos　God　speaks　his‘word，’
both　in　himself　and　beyond　himself”（ST，1，251）；“The‘Word’
is　first　of　all　the　principle　of　the　divine　self－manifestation　in　the
ground　of　being　itself”（ST，1，157）．This　clarification　of　the
locus　of　the　Logos　by　Tillich　will　become　crucially　suggestive，
when　it　comes　to　discussing　Takizawa’susage　of　the　botσ一ftzctum
Immanuel　in　his　critque　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　studies（see　II，　A，
1）．
　　　　　　At　any　rate，　on　this　ontological　level（thesis　1）God　is，
for　Takizawa，　already　fundamentally　with　us－－the　fact　that
satisfies　the　requirement　of　the　closer　God　we　mentioned　at　the
outset．　Yet，　on　the　functional　level　of　incarnation（thesis　2－a）
this　God－with－us，　namely　the　incarnate　Logos　or　the　Christ，　is
constituting　the　deeper　core　of　our　being　that　calls　us　into　the
business　of　selfrcreation　repeatedly　anew　to　which　we（including
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Jbsus　of　Nazareth）respond　on　the　contingent　level　of　incarnation
（thesis－b），　in止e　cおe　of知sus　in曲㎜er　of　utter　se撫皿ender，
as　was　beaut血lly　depicted　by　Tillich　earlier．　Thus，　the　requirement
of　the　deeper　Christ　is　also　satisfied．
C．Dynamic　Typology　and　Buddhism
　　　　　　In　this　paper　my　method　is　that　of　investigating　and
clarifying　Tillich’sviewpoints　with　regard　to　given　questions
while　pointing　out　Takizawa’sones　in　comparison　and　contrast
with　them，　and　vice　versa．　Accordingly，　thus　far　I　have　dealt
with　Tillich’sLogos　Christology　not　as　a　self－contained　system
but　as　a　system　open　to　dialogue　with　another　system，　Takizawa’s
Logos　Christology　that　has　arisen　in　the　Far　Eastern　country，
Japan，　against　a　quite　different　background．
　　　　　Takizawa　started　his　intellectual　career　as　an“anonymous”
student　of　Kitaro　Nishida，　the　founder　of　the　Kyoto　school　of
Buddhist　philosophy　while　being　a　Zen　meditator　himself．　As　a
matter　of　fact，　Takizawa　studied　philosophy　at　Kyushu　University，
but　not　at　Kyoto　University　where　Nishida　taught．　Takizawa
got　interested　in　Nishida’sphilosophy　and　wrote　an　article
entitled“Universals　and　Individuals”for　the　philosophy　journal
S賜so〔Thought〕，　August　1933．　Nishida　read　it　and　sent　a　letter
of　appreciation　on　his　own　to　Takizawa，　an　unknown　young
scholar－an　unusual　incident　in　the　pre－war　Japanese　academia．
When　he　was　given　a　Wilhelm　Humboldt　scholarship　to　study
in　Germany　in　the　early　1930’s，　Takizawa　followed　Nishida’s
advice　to　study　with　Karl　Barth　instead　of　Martin　Heidegger
because　the　latter　lacked　a　crucial　point　in　European　thought，
God．　Thus，　Takizawa’sLogos　Christology　was　formed　under
the　synthetic　influence　of　the　Eastern　and　Western　representative
thinkers，　Nishida　and　Barth．　In　this　sense，　Takizawa　is　almost
by　nature　a　specialist　in　the　field　of　“Christianity　and　the
Encounter　of　the　World　Religions（especially　Buddhism）．”
　　　　　By　contrast，　it　was　not　until　in　his　70’sthat　Tillich，　the
most　brilliant　Logos　Christologist　in　the　West　in　recent　times，
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realized　an　urgent　necessity　for　the　systematic　theologian　to
study　the　history　of　religions．　His　dialogue　with　Japanese
Buddhist　thinkers　during　his　visit　to　Japan　in　1960　was　in　this
respect　monumental，　not　only　in　his　professional　career　but　also
as　an　intellectual　event　between　the　East　and　West．　In　Japan，
he　declares，　there　was　no　question　of　his　being“converted”to
Zen　or　any　other　form　of　Buddhism．　But　rather，　he　had　many
opportunities　to　be　introduced　existentia〃y　into　what　were　to
him　strange　forms（）f　religious　life，　f6rms　which　showed　mconditional
seriousness　and　ultimate　concern　apart　from　any　Christian
influence．13　Doubtless　his　famous　methodology　of“dynamic
typology”in　dealing　with　world　religions，　was　first　conceived　in
this　connection．　The　method　he　intends　to　use　is　explained　as
follows：
The　kind　of　dialectics　which，　I　believe，　is　most　adequate
to　typological　inquiries　is　the　description　of　contrasting
poles　within　one　structure．　A　polar　relation　is　a　relation
of　inter－dependent　elements，　each　of　which　is　necessary
for　the　other　one　and　for　the　whole，　although　it　is　in
tension　with　the　opposite　element．　The　tension　drives
both　to　conflicts　and　beyond　the　conflicts　to　possible
unions　of　the　polar　elements．　Described　in　this　way，
types　lose　their　static　rigidity，　and　the　individual　things
and　persons　can　transcend　the　type　to　which　they　belong
without　losing　their　definite　character．（CEWR，55－56）
　　　　　Here　Tillich　is　in　the　process　of　going　beyond　a　merely
descriptive　study　of　religions．　Certainly　he　was　so　much　attracted
by　history　of　religions　that　he　even　had　a　joint　seminar　on
“History　of　Religions　and　Systematic　Theology’with　Mircea
Eliade　at　Chicago．　But　his　real　interest　was　in　the　theology　of
the　history　of　religions，　or　even　in　rewriting　his　Systematic
Theology　from　this　point　of　view，　because　he　saw　the　whole
history　of　religions　as“a　fight　of　God　within　religion　against
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religion”（FR，88，　italics　mine）．
　　　　　　Tillich’sexistential　concern　for　history　of　religions　as　a
theologian　as　thus　disclosed，　however，　is　one　thing，　the　question
of　the　value　of　his“dynamic　typology”is　quite　another．　He　has
come　to　realize　really　insightfully　that　every　living　religion
strives　dynamically　within　itself　in　polarity　and　tension　between
the　opposite　elements．　What　he　thus　concerns　himself　with　is
“the　question　of　the　intrinsic　aim　of　existence－－in　Greek，　the
telos　of　all　existing　things”（CEWR，63）．It　is　here，　Tillich
affirms，　that　one　should　start　every　interreligious　discu，ssion，
and　not　with　a　comparison　of　the　contrasting　concepts　of　God，
man，　history，　or　salvation（CEWR，63）．　Tillich　uses　no　such
merely　objectivistic　methods　in　arriving　at　his　concepts　as　many
philosophers　of　religion　would　cling　to　in　arriving　at　theirs．
Hence，　Tillich’sconviction　in　dialogue　with　Buddhism　as
follows：
In　the　dialogue　between　Christianity　and　Buddhism　two
telos－formulas　can　be　used：in　Christianity　the　telos　of
everyone　and　everything　united　in　the　Kingdom　of　God；
in　Buddhism　the　telos　of　everything　and　everyone　fulfilled
in　the　Nirvana．（CEWR，64）
　　　　　But　here　arises　a　difficult　problem：What　really　is　Tillich’　s
reason　for　believing　the　Christian　and　the　Buddhist　telos－formula
to　be　in　such　a　state　of　polarity？Tillich’sanswer　to　this
question　is　based　upon　his　understanding　that　both　terms，　the
Kingdom　of　God　and　Nirvana，　are　symbols．　To　him，　the　forrner
is　the　social，　political，　and　personalistic　symbol　with　its　symbolic
material　being　taken　from　the　ruler　of　a　realm　who　establishes　a
reign　of　justice　and　peace．　The　latter，　on　the　other　hand，　is　an
ontological　symbol　with　its　material　being　taken　from　the
experience　of　finitude，　separation　，　blindness，　and　suffering　with
the　effect　that　a　solution　to　those　existential　problems　is　sought
beyond　finitude　and　error，　in　the　image　of　the　blessed　oneness
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of　all　things　realized　in　the　ultimate　Ground　of　Being（CEWR，
64－65）．
　　　　　But，　I　ask：Are　they　merely　Sッmbols　taken　from　different
cultural　contexts？If　both　of　them　have　no　literal　relatedness
with　God　and　with　what　Tillich　calls“the　ultimate　Ground　of
Being”in　some　important　sense　or　another，　they　have　no
genuine　existential　meaning　after　all　either　for　the　Christian　or
for　the　Buddhist．　Here　I　agree　with　Hartshorne　who　says：
“Very　literally　we　are’in’God［i．e．，what　he　as　a　Whiteheadian
thinker　calls　the　consequent　or　concrete　nature　of　God］，　and　all
our　properties　are　divine　possession．”14　Furthermore，　I　contend
on　my　own　that　we　are“in”the　ultimate　metaphysical“Ground
of　Being，”and　that　all　our　properties　are　its　occasions　and
exemplifications．　And　if　we　are　at　once“in”the　personal　God
and　in　the　ultimate　metaphysical　Ground　of　Being，　this　at℃nce－ness
must　be　the　very　criterion　and　also　the　very　unity　of　the
contrasting　telos－formulas，　the　Kingdom　of　God　and　Nirvana．
　　　　　　But　the　theological　symbolism，　with　which　Tillich’s
Logos　Christology　is　significantly　shot　through，　has　led　him　to
pursue　a　quite　different　way　of　comparing　Chistianity　and
Buddhism．　First，　he　observes　that　the　Christian　symbol　of　the
Kingdom　of　God　and　the　Buddhist　symbol　of　Nirvana　are　both
based　upon　a　negative　valuation　of　existence：the　Kingdom　of
God　stands　against　the　kingdoms　of　this　world，　namely，　the
demonic　power－structures　which　rule　in　history　and　personal
life，　whereas　Nirvana　stands　against　the　world　of　seeming
reality　as　the　true　reality　from　which　the　individual　things　come
and　to　which　they　are　destined　to　retum．　Second，　Tillich　then
wants　to　scrutinize　decisive　differences　that　arise　from　this
common　basis．　He　writes：
In　Christianity　the　world　is　seen　as　creation　and　therefore
as　essentially　good；the　great　Christian　assertion，　esse　qua
esse　bonum　est，　is　the　conceptualization　of　the　Genesis
story　in　which　God　sees　everything　he　has　created“and
ANew　Possibility　for　Logos　Christology　113
behold，　it　was　very　good．”The　negative　judgment，
therefore，　in　Christianity　is　directed　against　the　world　in
its　existence，　not　in　its　essence，　against　the　fallen，　not
the　created，　world．　In　Buddhism　the　fact　that　there　is　a
world　is　the　result　of　an　ontological　Fall　into　finitude．
（CEWR，65）
　　　　　　Unfortunately，　this　is　a　total　misunderstnanding　of　the
Buddhist　view　of　the　world　of　actualities．　For　the　Buddhist，　the
world　of　actualities　arise　by　the　principle　of　dependent　co－orignination
（Skr．，ρtαtit．1ヒa－，samz‘sPad　z），while　at　the　same　time　being　absolutely
affirmed　by　the　metapysical　dynamism　of　Emptiness　emtying
itself，　as　was　intuitively　grasped　and　brilliantly　dwelt　upon　by
the　great　Mahayana　Buddhist　metaphysician　Nagarjuna（150－250
C．E．）．　The　net　result　of　Nagarjuna’sargument　for　Emptiness
（sunyata）is　this：Emptiness　is　finally　identical　with（the　world
of　actualities　as　it　is　governed　by　the　principle　of）　dependent
co－origination．151t　is　precisely　in　tandem　with　this　view　that
Masao　Abe　as　a“self－staking　participant”attacks　Tillich’s
misunderstanding　of　Bu，ddhism　in　these　words：“Identity　as　an
ontological　principle　of　Nirvana　is　not　identity　with　oneness
which　is　substantial，　but　identity　with　absolute　Nothingness．”16
　　　　　　1f　we　are　attentive　enough　to　this　basic　trait　of　the
Buddhist　world－view，　we　will　be　able　to　find　a　rather　common
procedure　of　arriving　at　the　essential　affirmation　of　the　worldly
actualities　as　a　whole（albeit　for　different　religio－philosophical
reasons）　in　the　representative　thinkers　of　the　both　religioins，
such　as　Anselm　and　Nagarjuna，　as　I　have　tried　to　show　elsewhere．17
This　does　not，　of　course，　mean　that　Tillich’sknowledge　of　the
consequences　of　the　afore－mentioned　basic　difference　between
Buddhism　and　Christianity　is　meaningless　and　inadequate．　He
rather　insightfully　states：“The　Ultimate　in　Christianity　is
symbolized　in　personal　categories，　the　Ultimate　in　Buddhism　in
transpersonal　categories，　for　example，’absolute　non－being’”
（CEWR，65－66）．　The　only　problem　is　how　one　can　persuasively
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compare　these　different　symbols　of　the　Ultimate　on　a　legitimate
basis．
　　　　　In　this　respect，　the　above　grave　misunderstanding　of　what
the　Buddhist　view　of　the　world　of　actualities　is　like　notwithstanding，
Tillich　nonetheless　shows　a　clear　case　of　Buddhist－Christian
comparison　by　asking“whether　the　nature　of　the　holy　has　not
forced　both　sides　to　include，　at　least　by　implication，　elements
which　are　predominant　in　the　other　side”（CEWR，66）．　He
acknowledges　that　the　symbol“Kingdom　of　God”appears　in　a
religious　develpment　in　which　the　holiness　of　the“ought　to　be”
is　predeminant　over　the　holiness　of　the“is，”and　that　the
“protesting”element　of　the　holy　is　predominant　over　the“sacra－
menta1”one．　Significantly　enough，　this　knowledge　of　Christianity
provides　him　with　perceiving　a　large　amount　of　mystical　and
sacramental　elements，　and　consequently　ideas　concerning　God
and　humanity　to　approximate　Buddhist　concepts．　Especially
important，　I　think，　is　the　fact　Tillich　has　come　up　with　the
insight　into　the　meaning　of　absolute　nothingness　in　Buddhist
thought　in　tandem　with　the　e∬e　ipsum，　being　itself，　of　the
classical　Christian　doctrine　of　God　as　a　transpersonal　category．
　　　　　Based　upon　the　experience　of　the　holy，　but　not　upon　a
negative　valuation　of　existence，　Tillich　is　enabled　to　grasp　that
“there　are　indications　in　the　history　of　both　symbols　that
converging　tendencies　exist”（CEWR，68）．　This　is　important，　in
my　own　view，　in　the　sense　that　by　virtue　of　the　experience　of
the　holy　as　this　is　linked　up　together　with　the　existence　of　the
Logos　in　the　midst　of　our　lives，　now　it　is　possible　for　us　to
study　comparatively　two　conflicting　and　yet　converging　symbols
in　a　really　correlative　manner．　First，　Tillich　refers　to　the
different　ontological　principles　that　lie　behind　the　connicting
symbols，　Kingdom　of　God　and　Narvana，　namely，“participation”
and“identity．”Tillich　explicates：“One　participates，　as　an
individual　being，　in　the　Kingdom　of　God．　One　is　identical　with
everything　that　is　in　Nirvana”（CEWR，68）．
　　　　　Second，　Tillich　speaks　of　the　ways　in　which　the　principles
ANew　Possibility　for　Logos　Christology　115
of　identity　and　participation　become　significant　for　the　relation
of　the　human　person　to　other　human　person　and　to　society．　He
can　say，　in　considerably　condensed　form，　that“participation
leads　to　agape，　identity　to　compassion”（CEWR，70）．　For
Tillich，　compassion　is　a　state　in　which　he　who　does　not　suffer
under　his　own　conditions　may　suffer　by　identification　with
another　who　suffers．　By　contrast，　agape　accepts　the　other　one，
even　the　unacceptable，　and　tries　to　transform　him，　either
directly，　or　indirectly　by　transformng　the　sociological　and
psychological　structures　by　which　he　is　conditioned，　in　the
direction　of　what　is　meant　by　the“Kingdom　of　God．”（CEWR，
71）
　　　　　Third，　Tillich　takes　up　the　problem　of　history　as　the　one
which　comes　into　the　foreground　of　the　dialogue－and　this　in
conjunction　with　the　problem　of　agape．　Now　we　are　brought
back　again　to　the　political　realm　of　apologetic　theology　or
missiology　through　the　enterprise　of　Buddhist－Christian　dialogue．
Tillich　clearly　knows　its　principle　which　he　depicts　in　these
words：
Under　the　predominance　of　the　symbol　of　the　Kingdom　of
God，　history　is　not　only　the　scene　in　which　the　destiny
of　individuals　is　decided，　but　it　is　a　movement　in　which
the　new　is　created　and　which　runs　ahead　to　the　absolutely
new，　symbolized　as“the　new　heaven　and　the　new　earth．”
（CEWR，72）
　　　　　But　how　can　this　transformative　principle　of　history　come
to　be　in　our　lives　in　Japan　that　are　governed　by　the　principle　of
identity？This　seems　to　me　one　of　the　most　fundamental　questions
we　need　to　ask　in　order　to　ascertain　the　importance　of　Logos
Christology　today．　For　the　transformative　principle　of　history　is
the　historical，　incarnate　aspect　of　the　divine　self－manifestation
of　the　divine　depth，　namely，　the　Logos．　What　I　can　see　in　the
following　passage　is　nothing　other　than　Tillich’sarticulation　of
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this　same　question：
Buddhist　Japan　wants　democracy，　and　asks　the　question　of
its　spiritual　foundation．　The　leaders　know　that　Buddhism
is　unable　to　furnish　such　a　foundation，　and　they　look　for
something　which　has　appeared　only　in　the　context　of
Christianity，　namely，　the　attitude　toward　eve】f・y　individual
which　sees　in　him　a　person，　a　being　of　infinite　value　and
equal　right　in　view　of　the　Ultimate．　Christian　conquerors
forced　democracy　upon　the　Japanese；they　accepted　it，but
then　they　asked：How　can　it　work　if　the　Christian　estimation
of　every　person　has　no　roots　either　in　Shintoism　or　in
Buddhism？（CEWR，74）
　　　　　Inherent　in　my　question　above，　which　is　articulated　by
Tillich　in　his　own　way　in　the　last　sentence，　is　a　concern　with
knowing　the　source　of　the　transformative　power　in　history．　The
Logos　as　the　transformative　power　in　history　is　an　evocative
power，　in　my　own　view，　insofar　as，　as　Tillich　impressively
explicates，“‘God　manifest’－the　mystery　of　the　divine　abyss
expressing　itself　through　the　divine　Logos－this　is　the　meaning
of　the　symbol，　the‘Word　of　God’”（ST，1，159）．　If　so，　my
question　turns　out　to　mean，　in　more　precise　terms：Whence
does　the　evocative　power　in　the　universe　as　this　expresses　itself
in　and　through　the　Logos　come？Does　it　have　nothing　to　do
with　the　principle　of　identity，　as　Tillich　seems　to　be　presupposing
when　he　says：Only　if　each　person　has　a　substance　of　his　own
is　community　possible，　for　community　presupPoses　separation・
You，　Buddhist　friends，　have　identity，　but　not　community”
（CEWR，75）？
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